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Historical call data records (HCDR) are frequently used 
as evidence in criminal trials. However, several 
inherent uncertainties are associated with HCDR data, 
and, additionally, errors may occur when law 
enforcement processes the data. In Denmark, 
processing errors were introduced into HCDR from 
2010 until 2019. The Danish authorities are currently 
reviewing more than 10,000 criminal cases in order to 
secure a fair trial. This article conducts a socio-
technical analysis of the Danish telecom scandal, 
which shows that, in addition to the processing errors 
highlighted,1 sources of error are related to 
competence, cognitive factors and inadequate quality 
management. 
Introduction  
The widespread use of mobile communication entails 
increased opportunities for law enforcement to 
secure relevant information that may contribute to 
solving crimes. Digital communication data in the 
form of historical call data records (HCDR) are 
frequently used in criminal trials as evidence. For 
instance, a search on the term “cell tower” in 
Norwegian verdicts returns 363 responses from the 
                                                          
1 For example, see the English case of R v Cahill; R v Pugh – 
a summary is set out at 9.90-9.95 in Stephen Mason and 
Daniel Seng, editors, Electronic Evidence (4th edn, Institute 
of Advanced Legal Studies for the SAS Humanities Digital 
Library, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 
2017), Open Access PDF version in the Humanities Digital 
Library at http://ials.sas.ac.uk/digital/humanities-digital-
library/observing-law-ials-open-book-service-
law/electronic-evidence ;see also Harold Thimbleby, 
‘Misunderstanding IT: Hospital cybersecurity and IT 
problems reach the courts’, 15 Digital Evidence and 
Electronic Signature Law Review (2018) 11 – 32; for the 
Ruling by the trial judge, see R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 
2014, Crown Court at Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 
period 1995-2020.2 HCDR can shed light on the 
circumstances of an incident, such as who has been in 
contact with whom (telephones/telephone numbers), 
at what time and/or at which location (cell 
tower/cell). 
Although HCDR have been useful, they have also been 
controversial and contested, due to the limitations 
and uncertainties associated with the information 
obtained from telecom service providers.3 
Before we proceed further in discussing what caused 
or contributed to error in the telecom scandal, it is 
necessary to outline how we understand the concept 
of error. An error may be described in many ways. 
Here, we relate the term “error” to validity, which we 
think of as “the overall probability of reaching the 
correct conclusion, given a specific method and 
data”.4 Thus, we understand error as the invalid 
results of a method or a process. Christensen and 
colleagues discuss error in forensic science and 
distinguish between different types of error due to 
the sources they originate from: practitioner error, 
instrument error, statistical error and method error; in 
before HHJ Crowther QC, 14 Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review (2017) 67 – 71. 
2 The search was performed with the Norwegian term 
“basestasjon” in Lovdata Pro: https://lovdata.no/pro/ 
performed 09 November 2020. 
3 See, for example, Coutts, R. P., & Selby, H. (2016). 
Problems with cell phone evidence tendered to prove the 
location of a person at a point in time. Digital Evidence & 
Elec. Signature L. Rev., 13, 76, and Cherry, M., Imwinkelried, 
E. J., Schenk, M., & Romano, A. (2011). Cell tower junk 
science. Judicature, 95, 151. 
4 Christensen, A. M., Crowder, C. M., Ousley, S. D., & Houck, 
M. M. (2014). Error and its meaning in forensic science. 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(1), 123-126. 
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the context of the telecom scandal, the first two are 
relevant.5 
Practitioner error refers to a mistake or operator 
(human) error. It may be random or systematic, 
intentional or unintended. The Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) also refers to tool 
usage and the interpretation of results as a human 
error.6 Every process that involves a human is prone 
to human error, particularly when the process 
involves subjectivity, interpretation, judgements and 
decisions. Examples of human errors are false 
negatives – they do not find what is actually there – or 
false positives, where they find or see something that 
is actually not present. A human may misinterpret the 
meaning of the evidence. When concluding or 
presenting the evidence, there is a risk of overstating 
(or understating) the relevance or reliability of the 
evidence. 
Practitioner error can be mitigated by quality 
assurance systems, training, proficiency testing, peer 
review, and adhering to validated protocols and 
discipline best practices. 
Instrument (or technological) error can be defined as 
the difference between an indicated instrument value 
and the actual (true) value. These errors may be 
related to the tools or techniques themselves or to 
the implementation of the tools or techniques.7 An 
error rate may be calculated through testing of the 
instrument or technology, and error may be 
minimized by proper maintenance and calibration.8 
In this article, we will first provide an overview of the 
Danish telecom scandal. We will outline the measures 
that were introduced in the wake of the telecom 
scandal and point out some limitations in relation to 
                                                          
5 Error and its meaning in forensic science, pp. 123-124. 
6 SWGDE, 2018. Establishing Confidence in Digital Forensic 
Results by Error Mitigating Analysis. Version: 2.0 (20. Nov, 
2018). SWGDE is the Scientific Working Group on Digital 
Evidence, based in the USA, and was formed by Federal 
Crime Laboratory Directors in 1998. 
7 SWGDE, 2018. Establishing Confidence in Digital and 
Multimedia Evidence Forensic Results by Error Mitigation 
Analysis. Version: 2.0 (20. Nov, 2018). 
8 Establishing Confidence in Digital and Multimedia 
Evidence Forensic Results by Error Mitigation Analysis, and 
Christensen, A. M., Crowder, C. M., Ousley, S. D., & Houck, 
M. M. (2014). Error and its meaning in forensic science. 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(1), 123-126. 
these. We then discuss the telecom scandal from a 
socio-technical perspective, with particular focus on 
the human factors that may have played a part. We 
argue that such a scandal may repeat itself in this or 
other domains if these factors are not taken into 
account. 
The Danish Telecom scandal  
Legal framework on the use of HCDR in Danish 
criminal cases 
Since 2007, Danish telecom service providers have 
been obliged by law to retain data related to 
telecommunication as regards traffic data (who is 
communicating with whom and when), the relevant 
location data, the means of communication used, etc., 
including certain user information connected to 
Internet sessions. The telecom service providers are 
required to keep the data for a year.9 Although such a 
retention regime was evaluated as contrary to EU law 
by the EU Court of Justice in 2016, no changes have 
been made to the Danish legislation.10 
In addition to the retained data, the telecom service 
providers might be in possession of other kinds of 
telecom data related to their network, for example 
“signalling data” from mobile units, meaning data 
generated from the cell towers related to a switched-
on mobile telephone that has not actively been used 
for communication. 
In the case of the police wishing to obtain HCDR from 
the telecom service provider in a specific 
investigation, this is regulated by the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act. Basically, a court order 
is required when the police wish to obtain HCDR from 
the service providers. However, the conditions and 
9 The Danish Judicial Procedure Act, § 786, and the Justice 
Department’s order no. 988 on 28th September 2006 about 
data retention. 
10 The Tele2 judgment on 21st December 2016, in the 
joined cases, Tele2 Sverige AB (C-203/15) and Watson (C-
698/15). See also Digital Rights judgment on 8th April 2014 
in the joined cases, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) and 
Kärntner Landesregierung (C-594/12). See Anja Møller 
Pedersen, Henrik Udsen and Søren Sandfeld Jakobsen: 
“Data retention in Europe – the Tele 2 case and beyond”, 
International Data Privacy Law, 2018, Vol. 8, No 2, pp. 160-
174. 
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procedures for obtaining the permit vary. Lenient 
conditions apply if the police only demand data 
concerning which cell tower was used by the mobile 
telephone at a given time (location data), whereas a 
more strict legal framework applies if the police 
demand data about which telephone communicated 
with which telephone at a given time (traffic data). A 
request for HCDR could relate to two different 
perspectives: related either to specific known 
telephones or to a certain place where a criminal 
offence has taken place and where the police would 
like to know which telephones were communicating in 
the area. 
The Telecom scandal  
On 17th June 2019, the Danish newspapers disclosed 
the news that the Director of Public Prosecutions had 
informed the Danish Bar and Law Society and the 
Danish Court Administration about an error in the 
police IT system. The error was identified and 
corrected on 8th March 2019, and the Director of 
Public Prosecutions had decided that a number of 
criminal cases from 2012-2019, where HCDR had been 
obtained, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
ordered a review and the Danish National Police. 
Subsequently, this news was followed by a number of 
critical articles from both technical and legal 
perspectives. The criticism was particularly levelled at 
the delay and incomplete information provided to the 
criminal system and the public. As a result of the 
increasing number of errors and uncertainties 
discovered in the handling of HCDR and the 
subsequent considerations, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions ordered a halt of two months in the 
prosecutors’ use of HCDR as evidence in criminal trials 
and hearings about preliminary custody. Currently, 
more than 10,000 criminal cases from the period 
2010-2019 are being reviewed in order to establish 
the implications caused by errors and uncertainties in 
telecom data used as evidence.11 According to the 
District Attorney in Copenhagen supervising the 
review, the status as at February 2020, is that, of the 
approximately 10,000 cases, 7,576 cases relate to 
                                                          
11 The period in focus was extended, as 2010 was the 
starting point for the initial use of the police converting 
software; for which see below. 
12 Mail communications to the authors on 17th and 18th 
February 2020 from the District Attorney in Copenhagen. 
13 The Norwegian Director of Public Prosecutions (28th 
August 2019. Possible misinformation in traffic- and 
convictions, and the rest of the cases concern 
unsolved, serious crime.12 To date, the Task Force has 
reviewed 213 convictions. In 38 of these cases, the 
initial opinion was that telecom data might have 
influenced the outcome of the trial. However, the 
conclusion from the prosecution’s review was that 
there were no grounds for reconsidering the 
conviction in these cases, as no relevant errors had 
been detected in the telecom data. 
The telecom scandal also led to consequences outside 
Denmark. According to the Nordic Police Cooperation 
Treaty, the police in the Nordic countries may assist 
each other in obtaining evidence in criminal 
investigations. As far as the authors are aware, the 
following description is limited to what occurred in 
Norway. The first media reports in Norway came in 
June 2019. On 29th August, the Norwegian Director of 
Public Prosecutions instructed the police districts, 
national police units and state attorneys to identify all 
the pending Norwegian criminal cases with HCDR 
obtained from within Denmark. In this letter, the 
recipients were informed that the system in which the 
error occurred was not in used in Norway, and that 
there was no reason to suspect the same errors in 
Norwegian HCDR.13 On 15th January 2020, the 
Norwegian Director of Public Prosecutions sent an 
update to the same recipients, informing them that 
only a very limited number of ongoing cases involving 
Danish HCDR data had been identified, and only a few 
where further evaluations of possible consequences 
due to erroneous data were necessary. The recipients 
were instructed to expand the scope of their 
evaluations to include closed cases involving Danish 
HCDR from March 2010 to March 2019. The Director 
of Public Prosecutions also underlined that the police 
districts had experienced significant challenges in 
identifying the cases, due to the lack of registries and 
limited search functionalities. How many hours this 
task has entailed is unknown, but, due to the reported 
challenges, there is reason to believe that it has 
required a significant workload. 
location data obtained from Denmark. Identification and 
review of relevant cases. Riksadvokaten (28 August 2019) 
Mulig feilinformasjon i trafikk- og lokasjonsdata innhentet 
fra Danmark. Identifisering og gjennomgang av aktuelle 
saker. https://www.riksadvokaten.no/document/mulig-
feilinformasjon-i-teledata-brukt-i-straffesaker/. 
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Conclusions on the technical error  
The Telecenter, a department under the Danish 
National Police, acts as the single point of contact 
between Danish police and the telecom service 
providers. The telecom service providers have 
different systems for storing and retrieving 
information, and information is therefore delivered in 
several different formats to the police.14 The telecom 
service providers are not obliged to use a uniform 
concept, nor are they paid for the data retention. The 
different formats result from different needs within 
each telecom company, related to operating the 
system and billing the customers. Since 2010, the 
Telecenter has processed the files from the telecom 
service providers prior to sending them to the 
respective police districts. Several of the errors have 
been traced back to the processing of data at the 
Telecenter. 
From the information given by the Danish Minister of 
Justice on 3rd October 2019, and on the basis of 
conclusions from both the internal examinations 
carried out by the Director of Public Prosecutions and 
the Danish National Police and an independent 
external review carried out by the consultancy agency, 
Deloitte, the technical errors in the system relate to 
the entire chain from the cell tower registering the 
data to the transmission of the data to the requesting 
police unit.15 The errors can be summarized into three 
overall categories, set out below. 
(1) Completeness: missing rows as a result of 
processing by police software  
The telecom service providers register the HCDR in 
databases. Following a request from the police, data is 
retrieved from these databases and delivered in a 
format based on cells, rows and columns, such as 
those you find in a spreadsheet.16 Each 
                                                          
14 The external examination carried out by Deloitte, (2019) 
p. 15, in connection to the Danish Telecom scandal, for 
which see below. Deloitte identified that the police 
received 100 different formats of raw data in the period 
from 2011-2019. 
15 The Minister’s information, including the internal and 
external examinations as Appendices, are available at URL: 
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-
presse/pressemeddelelser/2019, see: “Justitsministerens 
reaktion på teledata-redegørelser” (”The Minister of 
Justice’s reaction to the telecom examinations”, translation 
by the authors as information and examinations are only 
available in Danish). The Deloitte examination was updated 
communication activity, such as telephone calls, SMS, 
duration of the call, and cell tower position (first and 
last cell tower during the conversation), etc., is 
registered as a row. When converting the rows from 
the raw data, an error in the police software resulted 
in the loss of rows and, hence, incomplete HCDR. 
The reason for the loss of rows was found in a certain 
“timer” function in the police IT system, used for 
converting data into the uniform format. In order to 
ensure efficient forwarding of the data to the 
requesting police unit, a timer function was set in the 
Telecenter’s IT system, e.g. one hour. However, the 
system was not programmed to check whether the 
processing was complete prior to sending the file, and 
the result was that the data were sometimes sent to 
the requesting police unit, even though the converting 
process was not complete. Occasionally, this resulted 
in the Telecenter sending incomplete sets of 
converted data with “missing rows” to the 
requester.17 
The implications of such an error would depend on 
the specific criminal case. In the question of an alibi, it 
might be catastrophic for a defendant who claimed to 
have been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime, if 
the data that could confirm his or her statement was 
among the “missing rows” in the incomplete HCDRs. 
Not only would the missing rows cause lack of support 
for the alibi, but the missing information could also be 
held against the defendant’s trustworthiness, for not 
being truthful about where he or she was at a certain 
time. 
(2) Errors in the converted data  
In addition to the missing rows, several other errors 
resulting from the process of converting the data 
were uncovered in the HCDRs. The conversion process 
also led to alteration of the cell towers’ geographical 




16 For a discussion about the highly significant errors in 
spreadsheets, see Electronic Evidence, xii-xiii ’Business 
records’ and 7.144. 
17 See the internal examination from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Director of the Danish National Police, 
28th September 2019 (Appendix 2), p. 62, and the external 
examination from Deloitte, 1st October 2019 (Appendix 3), 
pp. 33 and 47. 
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coordinates. According to the external examination, 
the predominant error in the conversion caused a 
difference in the cell tower position of approximately 
220 metres; in a smaller number of requisitions, a 
deviation of approximately 100 metres was 
identified.18 Other errors resulting from this process 
were found in in- and outgoing conversations, the 
duration of the calls, and types of service (telephone 
call, SMS, Internet session). 
When the telecom scandal emerged, this reccurring 
error questions the trustworthiness of telecom data. 
However, the conclusion must be that this error 
alone, meaning a displacement of a cell tower of this 
rather small scale, would rarely have an effect on 
criminal cases. This should be seen in connection with 
the general uncertainties about using telecom data as 
evidence, for which see discussion below. 
(3) Errors in raw data  
The third category of errors uncovered in the telecom 
scandal involves errors in raw data from the telecom 
service providers. This category consists of several 
types of errors. Some are considered to pose a low 
risk of problems in criminal investigations, since they 
could be detected fairly easily. An example of such an 
error is the switching of geographical coordinates, 
which would result in the cell tower appearing to be 
situated far away from Danish territory.19 Others pose 
a great risk of providing misleading information in 
criminal investigations. For example, the telecom 
service providers store information about the 
geographical position of their cell towers. However, 
over the years, some cell towers have been moved to 
different locations, without updating the information 
about the new geographical position of the cell tower 
and the range of its cells.20 This had already been 
acknowledged as a problem in 2015, by the Minister 
of Justice giving a reply on the matter to the Danish 
parliament.21 Nevertheless, this problem has probably 
                                                          
18 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
55. 
19 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
39. 
20 The internal examination from the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Director of the Danish National Police 
(Appendix 2), p. 22, and the external examination from 
Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 39. 
21 Reply from the Ministry of Justice on 20th October 2015 
to question no. 182 from the Parliament’s Legal Affairs 
Committee, and the internal examination from the Director 
not been paid the appropriate attention over the 
years. A few months after the outbreak of the telecom 
scandal, the Danish newspaper Politiken considered 
the list of cell towers in detail, and compared their 
registered address and their geographical coordinates. 
They found significant differences between these two 
registrations for several cell towers. The biggest 
discrepancy uncovered was more than 100 
kilometres. When discrepancies occurred, they mostly 
concerned the coordinates, which established the 
correct position, and, to a lesser extent, the address.22 
The effect of such a problem is difficult to establish, as 
the procedures within the Telecenter in the Danish 
National Police have not clarified this point. It is 
unclear whether they based their assumptions about 
the suspect’s geographical location on the address or 
the coordinates, and whether they carried out a 
control for discrepancies between the two types of 
location registrations. In any case, the differences in 
such registrations in specific cases could possibly have 
been discovered by the requesting police unit and 
then resolved in cooperation with the Telecenter and 
the telecom service providers. 
Besides the irregularities concerning the cell tower 
locations, the internal and external examinations have 
also revealed other types of errors in raw data from 
the telecom service providers. Thus, calls and SMS are 
also possible by application of new communication 
services, VoLTE (Voice over Long-Term Evolution) and 
VoWiFi (Voice over WiFi). In connection with the 
examinations, it was revealed that not all telecom 
service providers had delivered all communication 
data concerning these new data types.23 This means 
that the raw data material provided by the telephone 
companies without these data would be incomplete. 
Apart from these identified errors, it has been pointed 
out that the vast diversity in raw data is a possible 
source of error. As part of the external examination, a 
of Public Prosecutions and the Director of the Danish 
National Police (Appendix 2), p. 22. 
22 Jakob Sorgenfri Kjær: “Telefejl er endnu værre end 
antaget”; https://politiken.dk/indland/art7389985/Telefejl-
er-endnu-v%C3%A6rre-end-antaget, and “Vagthund ser 
med alvor på nye telefejl” ; 
https://politiken.dk/indland/art7406682/Vagthund-ser-
med-alvor-p%C3%A5-nye-telefejl, both in Politiken, 27th 
September 2019. 
23 The internal examination (Appendix 2), p. 66. 
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statistical comparison was carried out on the raw data 
formats provided by the different telephone 
companies. Conclusively, 100 different formats from 
the period 2011-2019 were identified, with each of 
the 100 data formats varying in at least one of either: 
(1) the order of the columns, (2) the terminology in 
the columns, or (3) the number of columns.24 
Illustratively, 30 different formats for dates were 
identified.25 
This diversity and the ever-changing raw data formats 
represent a significant challenge to the Telecenter. 
Changes in the raw data format would require a 
control of whether the interpretation is still valid. To 
ensure a valid interpretation of the raw data at all 
times, the software would thus need to be frequently 
controlled and updated.26 The external review 
revealed that only one person at the Telecenter was 
appointed to this task.27 The frequent changes to raw 
data formats entail a risk of error, if the resources or 
manpower for controlling and updating the system 
are limited.28 
In addition to the errors mentioned above, the 
inherent limitations and uncertainties with HCDR 
must be taken into account. The HCDR are first and 
foremost registered for the telecom service providers’ 
business purposes. The data are used for optimizing 
the telecom service, charging for the services and 
billing the customers. HCDR are hence not stored for 
law enforcement purposes and may have limitations 
and uncertainties that should be taken into account 
when using these data as evidence about who did 
what, at which time (and duration), and from which 
position. HCDR are a product of the service offered by 
telecom companies, where a unit (e.g. a mobile 
telephone) communicates with the telecom service 
provider’s network and infrastructure (cell towers, 
antennas, and devices for collection and storing 
telecom data). The cell towers have antennas, which 
cover different areas, named cells. Each cell has a cell 
identification (cell id) and two traits – coverage and 
capacity. There are several factors that affect the 
                                                          
24 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
35. 
25 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
35. 
26 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), pp. 
37-38. 
27 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
9. 
coverage of the cell, such as – but not limited to – the 
height of the cell tower, the frequency, power and 
configuration of the antenna, the vegetation, the 
surrounding settlement and topography. The capacity 
is also limited, and when it reaches its limits, the call 
may be directed to the next cell tower within the 
coverage area. These limitations mean that it is never 
possible to state with 100 per cent certainty that a cell 
phone was at a certain place at a certain time, based 
on the HCDR. 
Organizational and procedural aspects  
On 3rd October 2019, on the basis of the internal 
examination, the Danish Minister of Justice concluded 
that, within the Danish National Police, there had not 
been sufficient inspection of the quality of the data 
and there had not been sufficient documentation and 
follow up of errors. Consequently, information about 
known errors and risks related to HCDR had not been 
systematically sent to the relevant parties dealing 
with criminal cases. Furthermore, throughout the 
years, the management’s focus on the Telecenter has 
been insufficient.29 
Specifically, the internal examination mentions that, 
within the Telecenter, no written internal procedures 
and guidelines in relation to handling HCDR have been 
developed, nor, additionally, has the Danish National 
Police developed any national guidelines for the 
Telecenter’s and the police units’ handling of HCDR 
and quality control of the data.30 
In relation to checking the quality of the data, an 
external examination concluded that, before 2018, no 
general checking of the quality of the telecom data 
received from the Telecenter was carried out by the 
requesting police unit, as there was the overall 
presumption that the HCDR received were correct and 
complete, and therefore it was not common practice 
to check whether data in the converted file were 
complete.31 
28 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
38. 
29 The information given by the Minister of Justice on 3rd 
October 2019. 
30 The internal examination (Appendix 2), p. 90. 
31 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
67. 
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Since November 2018, the Telecenter has enclosed a 
guideline for quality control of the data when sending 
HCDR to the requesting police units.32 The guideline 
advises the receiver to compare the number of lines in 
the raw data with the converted data and to check 
whether the numbers match.33 
Importantly, however, the telecom scandal is also 
related to outdated and insufficient IT systems and 
software within the Danish police in general, and 
within the Telecenter in particular. The external 
examination quite disturbingly states that the 
outdated technical infrastructure poses a significant 
risk to the continuing operational stability, meaning to 
securing the continuing delivery of converted telecom 
data.34 Even immediate remedies to the existing 
infrastructure are considered insufficient; hence, 
there is a need to implement a new infrastructure, 
adequate for modern standards.35 
Actions to be taken according to the Minister of 
Justice 
In his conclusion on the telecom scandal and the way 
forward, the Minister of Justice presented a list of 13 
initiatives: 
1. Establishment of a new independent unit, 
monitoring technical investigative means and 
evidence. 
2. The problems inherent in telecom data must 
be declared in any court proceedings. 
3. Establishment of certification of quality 
control within the Telecenter. 
4. Strengthening the Telecenter with resources 
and more specialized competencies. 
5. Establishment of a new cooperation forum 
between the police and the telecom industry. 
6. Relevant education and improvement of 
competencies for the users of telecom data. 
7. Requesting police units must improve control 
of the telecom data they receive. 
                                                          
32 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), pp. 
17 and 78. 
33 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
78. 
8. Purchasing special equipment to be able to 
examine the coverage of cell towers in specific 
places. 
9. New guidelines for the deletion of telecom 
data. 
10. Modernization of existing IT systems. 
11. Systematic scrutiny of more than 400 IT 
systems within the police and the prosecution 
service. 
12. Review of IT systems, where technical 
evidence is stored and processed, e.g. DNA 
samples and fingerprints. 
13. Evaluation and learning from the telecom data 
incident throughout the Justice Department. 
In the following, we limit our discussion to initiatives 1 
and 2. The understanding of “an independent unit” 
(initiative 1), and the handling of inherent 
uncertainties in telecom data (initiative 2) is discussed 
below. 
The understanding of “an independent unit”  
Concerning the establishment of a new independent 
unit (initiative 1), on 3rd October 2019, the Danish 
Minister of Justice indicated a need for “a new, 
independent unit to supervise the process from the 
time when an investigation goes through a technical 
process until the time when the results of the 
investigation are presented as evidence for guilt in a 
criminal case.”36 
Accordingly, the competence for the independent unit 
should be to supervise “investigative means” in a 
broad sense, not only as regards telecom data. 
However, the focus on an investigation “going 
through a technical processing” suggests quite a 
narrow scope, when considering the telecom data 
case, where, clearly, raw data in itself also present 
serious errors and uncertainties, even if the police 
have not exposed the data to any processing or 
conversion of raw data that the police might perform. 
In a draft proposal for new regulation, published on 
21st February 2020, the Ministry of Justice suggests 
34 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
7. 
35 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
7. 
36 Translation by the authors. 
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the establishment of a new independent unit for the 
supervision of technical evidence, connected to the 
Independent Police Complaints Authority. The 
proposal implies a broad scope for the new 
independent unit, as the term “technical evidence” is 
understood as all information, tracks and material 
gathered to be subjected to a technical examination 
or process, leading to the presentation of the data as 
evidence in a criminal trial.37 
The purpose of the independent unit would be to 
supervise the development of adequate and relevant 
procedures and guidelines – and their use by 
practitioners within the police and the prosecution 
service – as regards the handling and processing of 
specific kinds of technical evidence.38 Furthermore, 
the supervision would also be carried out in relation 
to standard declarations, police reports, etc., in order 
to confirm that reservations and uncertainties related 
to specific kinds of evidence are appropriately 
described. In addition, the supervision would concern 
whether the prosecution in general presents these 
reservations and uncertainties in connection with the 
evidence used in criminal trials. 
Specifically, the draft proposal emphasizes that the 
supervision would not aim to verify conclusions from 
the examination or processing of technical 
information in specific cases (e.g. whether a DNA 
match can be verified or whether a person’s cell 
phone has been registered in connection with specific 
towers, according to the service provider’s 
information) or how these conclusions specifically 
have been used during the police investigation. 
Based on the telecom scandal, the responsibilities 
given to this independent unit should be carefully 
considered. Given the importance of digital evidence 
and our general trust and naivety regarding such 
evidence,39 arguments support a quite broad scope 
                                                          
37 Draft proposal for new regulation, published by the 
Ministry of Justice, 21st February 2020, p. 33, available at 
https://hoeringsportalen.dk/Hearing/Details/63761%20. 
The completion of the regulation concerning the 
independent unit is now scheduled to be part of the 
government’s program for the parliamentary year 
2020/2021. 
38 Draft proposal for new regulation, published by the 
Ministry of Justice, 21st February 2020, p. 9. 
39 This is comprehensively dispelled in Chapter 6 of 
Electronic Evidence and in Peter Bernard Ladkin, Bev 
for the unit: not only overlooking procedures of 
conversion, but also the requiring of data in general, 
taking samples and perhaps even seeking to verify 
conclusions in specific cases, mapping uncertainties 
and securing a dialogue and cooperation with the 
provider of the data, whether private companies or 
public institutions. We do not know what we might 
not know in the future, and a constant critical focus 
on new sorts of data and evidence must be secured. 
The conclusion from the statements from the Danish 
Ministry of Justice must be that the 13 initiatives and 
the focus by all parties involved within the police, 
prosecution service and courts are seen as sufficient 
to “repair” the errors and uncertainties connected 
with the procedures of acquiring and processing 
telecom data and thus “repair” the general confidence 
in the reliability of such technical evidence used in 
criminal cases. 
Understanding telecom data  
Recently, new and detailed instructions, from both 
the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the Danish 
National Police, have been produced on the use of 
telecom data in criminal cases.40 The overall aim is to 
secure quality procedures – and the documentation 
thereof – in both the requiring police units and the 
prosecution service, when presenting the case and the 
evidence in court. 
As stated in the new Instruction from the Director of 
Public Prosecutions: In criminal cases, where telecom 
data is presented as evidence, the prosecutor must 
verify that all relevant documents are presented. This 
means that documents must include raw data and, if 
processing had been carried out, also converted data, 
besides a report describing the police check of the 
data quality. Furthermore, a general note developed 
by Deloitte on general aspects related to the use of 
telecom data must always be included in criminal 
Littlewood, Harold Thimbleby and Martyn Thomas CBE, 
‘The Law Commission presumption concerning the 
dependability of computer evidence’, 17 Digital Evidence 
and Electronic Signature Law Review (2020) 1 – 14. 
40 “Anvendelse af teledata i straffesager” (“The use of 
telecom data in criminal cases”, translation by the authors), 
issued by the Directorate of Public Prosecutions on 29th 
October 2019 (latest update on 3rd of April 2020), at 
https://vidensbasen.anklagemyndigheden.dk/h/6dfa19d8-
18cc-47d6-b4c4-3bd07bc15ec0/VB/dfa9e79e-2c97-4013-
81c9-5699a5ffb3ef?showExact=true (only available in 
Danish). 
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cases where telecom data are presented as evidence, 
“with the purpose of securing relevant knowledge 
with the defence and the court about the potential 
sources of errors and uncertainties connected to the 
use of telecom data.”41 
The “Note about the use of historic telecom data in 
criminal cases”, dated 1st October 2019, is developed 
by Deloitte in connection with the external 
examination.42 The note contains a list of the inherent 
uncertainties related to cell tower data and thus 
attention points and reservations regarding the use of 
such data as evidence. 
Data can be missing in the data rows presented, for a 
number of different reasons, e.g. new kinds of data- 
and communication services, where data are not 
registered by the telecom service providers in the 
same way as traditional tele-communications. Also, 
the selection of which cell towers are relevant can 
mean that not all data will be put forward, if a mobile 
unit has used another cell tower for communication.43 
In this regard, the note emphasizes that HCDR do not 
show the same accuracy as a GPS system in relation to 
locating a specific mobile telephone.44 This highlights 
the uncertainties surrounding location data for mobile 
units.45 First and foremost, it is noted that such data 
can only be indicative. This is due to a number of 
different aspects: the landscape, network 
malfunctions and changes in weather and season, and 
to which cell tower a specific mobile unit connects 
(“cell tower jumps”.) More specifically, it mentions 
that fewer obstacles in the terrain lead to a stronger 
mobile signal; hence, a mobile unit would be able to 
connect to a cell tower over longer distances across 
water than over land. In rural areas, there would be 
fewer cell towers, meaning the telephone (telephone 
is used for short-hand, but we mean SIM card, or a 
combination of telephone and SIM card) could “jump” 
and connect to a cell tower further away. The 
                                                          
41 Points 1 and 2.4.2 in the Instruction “Anvendelse af 
teledata i straffesager”, (“The use of telecom data in 
criminal cases”, translation by the authors) issued by the 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions on 29th October 2019 
(latest update on 3rd of April 2020), available at 
https://vidensbasen.anklagemyndigheden.dk/h/6dfa19d8-
18cc-47d6-b4c4-3bd07bc15ec0/VB/dfa9e79e-2c97-4013-
81c9-5699a5ffb3ef?showExact=true (only available in 
Danish). 
42 Deloitte Note: ”Notat vedrørende anvendelse af 
historiske teledata i straffesager”, (available only in Danish, 
accuracy of location data can, on one hand, be as 
close as a few hundred m2 in closer urban areas and, 
on the other hand, be extended to several km2 in rural 
areas. The applied technologies can also play a role in 
the range of the cell tower signal. Besides, specific 
operating conditions can result in errors in the 
network, with the consequence that a mobile unit at a 
given time connects to other cell towers than if the 
network were functioning normally.46 
Keeping these reservations in mind, the note 
mentions that telecom data can be used to indicate 
the location and movements of a specific mobile unit 
over time. The more connections between a certain 
mobile unit with a certain cell tower, the more 
significant the data could be interpreted to be.47 
Besides telecom data, which telecom service 
providers are obliged by law to register and keep for a 
year, the note from Deloitte also elaborates on other 
sorts of telecom data that the telecom service 
providers might have and that could be required for 
specific criminal cases. This concerns “signalling data” 
from mobile units, meaning data generated from the 
cell towers related to a switched-on mobile telephone 
that has not actively been used (called “idle mode” in 
contrast to “connected mode”, where a telephone is 
communicating either by calls, SMS or Internet 
connection).48 There are reservations regarding 
signalling data, as they are less precise and thus less 
reliable.49 
Relating to raw data, the note draws attention to the 
risk of errors in the registration of cell towers, namely, 
the insecurity related to the specification of the 
address of a cell tower, where the coordinates are 
considered more reliable.50 In addition, according to 
recent guidelines from the Danish National Police, 
establishing the location of the cell tower must not be 
based on information about the address provided by 
title translated by the authors), available at 
https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media
/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2019/bilag_4.pdf. 
43 Deloitte Note, point 3.1.2. 
44 Deloitte Note, point 3.1.1. 
45 Deloitte Note, point 3.2.2. 
46 Deloitte Note, point 3.3. 
47 Deloitte Note, point 3.2.2. 
48 Deloitte Note, points 3.1.4. and 4.4. 
49 Deloitte Note, points 3.1.4. and 4.4. 
50 Deloitte Note, points 3.3.  
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the telephone companies.51 Instead, the location of 
cell towers must be based on geographical 
coordinates of the cell towers, provided appropriate 
checks have been made, meaning a documentation of 
the physical location of cell towers, based on 
observation of the cell tower or material from 
surveillance.52 
The Danish National Police emphasize that, despite 
these new actions to be taken, it will always rely on 
the participants involved in specific cases – not least 
the courts – to evaluate how telecom data most 
appropriately can be presented as evidence, and to 
what extent further evidence is necessary, in order to 
verify the specific telecom data.53 
Socio technical aspects of the telecom 
scandal 
No process involving technology operates in a 
vacuum. Socio-technical systems thinking is therefore 
an adequate theoretical perspective to apply in order 
to understand how the telecom scandal emerged, and 
how new similar scandals may be prevented. The 
underlying philosophy of socio-technical systems 
thinking has remained largely unchanged, but the 
specific principles and applications have evolved to 
reflect the changing nature of work, technology and 
design practices.54 The emphasis has shifted from an 
early focus on heavy industry and advanced 
manufacturing technologies, through to office-based 
work and services.55 The common theme across these 
                                                          
51 The Instruction “Anvendelse af teledata i straffesager” 
(“Use of telecom data in criminal cases”, translation by the 
authors), issued by the Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
on 29th October 2019, with the Appendix 7b: “Rigspolitiets 
Instruks for politiets anvendelse af teledata til brug for 
retsmøder under efterforskningen” (“Guidelines from the 
Danish National Police on the use of telecom data in 
hearings related to criminal investigations”, translation by 
the authors) on 18th September 2019. 
52 Instruction on the use of telecom data in criminal cases, 
issued by the Directorate of Public Prosecutions on 29th 
October 2019, with the Appendix 7b: Guidelines from the 
Danish National Police on the use of telecom data in 
criminal investigations, on 18th September 2019. 
53 Considerations from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Director of Danish National Police, p. 6 in Appendix 
1 to the Information given by the Minister of Justice on 3rd 
October 2019. 
contexts has been a focus on the introduction of new 
technologies. 
Socio-technical systems theory advocates the 
consideration of both technical and social factors 
when seeking to promote change within an 
organization, whether it concerns the introduction of 
new technology or when there is a change in the 
business.56 Leavitt visualized these as four 
components (structure, technology, people, task) that 
should be in harmony.57 This has been further 
developed into a hexagon of six interrelated elements 
(see figure below). 
Figure 1: Hexagonal socio-technical systems 
framework, as described by Clegg and others.58 
54 Davis, M. C., Challenger, R., Jayewardene, D. N. W., & 
Clegg, C.W. (2014). Advancing socio-technical systems 
thinking: A call for bravery. Applied Ergonomics, 45(2A), 
171-180. doi: 10.1016/j.apergo.2013.02.009. 
55 Advancing socio-technical systems thinking: A call for 
bravery. 
56 Cherns, A. (1976). The principles of sociotechnical design. 
Human Relations, 29(8), 783-792. doi: 
10.1177/001872677602900806 
57 Leavitt, H. J. (1965). Applying organizational change in 
industry: Structural, technological and humanistic 
approaches. In J. G. March (Ed.), Handbook of 
Organizations (pp. 1144-1170). Chicago, IL, USA: Rand 
McNally. 
58 Clegg, C., Robinson, M., Davis, M., Bolton, L., Pieniazek, 
R., & McKay, A. (2017). Applying organizational psychology 
as a design science: A method for predicting malfunctions 
in socio-technical systems (PreMiSTS). Design Science, 3, E6. 
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To work optimally, these interrelated elements must 
function in harmony. When exploring the factors that 
may have caused or contributed to error in the 
telecom scandal, it is necessary to consider all the 
interconnected elements in a socio-technical system. 
Covering all will be outside the scope of this article, 
and we will limit our discussion here to cover people, 
technology and processes. . 
Human error as a cause or contributing factor in 
the telecom scandal  
People play an important role in a socio-technical 
system, and, when exploring the factors that may 
have caused or contributed to error in the telecom 
scandal, we should consider human factors. Here, we 
will discuss the following aspects as possible sources 
of error: competence and cognitive factors. 
Competence  
Identifying, collecting, examining, analysing and 
presenting digital evidence in a forensically sound 
manner requires competence.59 Forensically sound is 
“The application of a transparent digital forensic 
process that preserves the original meaning of the 
data for production in a court of law.” 60 There should 
be documentation of the continuity of evidence (also 
called chain of custody) for the evidence, which means 
documentation regarding where the evidence has 
been kept at all times and who has handled it.61 The 
principle of evidence integrity should be considered 
paramount, which means that the data should be 
preserved in its original form.62 HCDR often require 
processing in order to derive meaningful information 
from them in the context of a criminal investigation. 
This involves splitting up and assembling information 
pieces,63 for instance identifying all incoming and 
outgoing calls from a certain time period from several 
HCDRs. Any restructuring of data should not result in 
data being deleted or alter the original data in a way 
                                                          
doi:10.1017/dsj.2017.4. Image published under a creative 
commons licence (CC-BY 4.0). 
59 Sunde, N. (2017). Non-technical sources of errors when 
handling digital evidence within a criminal investigation 
(Master's thesis, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology). 
60 McKemmish, R. (2009). When is digital evidence 
forensically sound? In IFIP international conference on 
digital forensics (pp. 3-15). Springer, Boston, MA. p. 10. 
that changes its meaning. Maintaining the evidence 
integrity of telecom data requires competence in 
processing the data, assessing the quality, as well as 
documenting the result. 
In relation to the telecom scandal, the Telecenter 
carried out the process of converting the data into 
one format. Hence, the Telecenter had the main 
responsibility for the quality of the product they 
delivered. As mentioned above, in December 2018, 
the Telecenter started including guidelines for quality 
control of the data, together with the raw data and 
converted data files. Up until this point in time, the 
police districts had not been instructed or encouraged 
by the Telecenter to perform any quality control of 
the data. The new guidelines encouraged the recipient 
of the HCDR to compare the number of rows in the 
raw data against the converted data, to assess 
whether they matched.64 If performed, this procedure 
would be an inadequate quality measure, since it 
would only validate that the files were of a similar size 
but would reveal nothing about the integrity of the 
data. Despite the guidelines, the control of 
completeness was not performed by the police 
districts. The lack of quality control from the 
Telecenter and the insufficient guidelines for quality 
control directed to the police districts demonstrated 
the inadequate level of competency in handling data 
at the Telecenter, as well as in the police districts. 
Competence is also necessary to derive meaning from 
telecom data, while taking the inherent limitations 
into account. Telecom data may appear to be reliable 
information, since they are accurate and expressed in 
numeric values. The HCDR data are accurate down to 
the second; the cell towers are in numeric GPS 
coordinates. The precise representation of time or 
place may give the impression that the data is valid, 
and diminish the attention about limitations and 
errors. Making valid inferences based on telecom data 
requires competence regarding why and how the data 
61 Casey, E. (2011). Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: 
Forensic Science, Computers, and the Internet. Academic 
Press, p. 21; for a discussion in the legal context, see 
Electronic Evidence, Chapter 9. 
62 Årnes, A. (2017). Introduction. In A. Årnes (Ed.) Digital 
Forensics (pp. 1-11). Hoboken: Wiley, p. 6. 
63 Bjerknes, O. T., & Fahsing, I. A. (2018). Etterforskning: 
prinsipper, metoder og praksis. Fagbokforlaget, p. 125. 
64 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
17. 
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are collected and stored by the telecom service 
provider and the inherent limitations of the data. 
What may be accurate and sufficiently reliable for the 
purpose of the telecom service provider may deviate 
from the required quality to serve as reliable evidence 
in legal proceedings. 
Cognitive factors, influences and bias  
Regardless of the competence level of the people 
involved in handling the telecom data, there are other 
human limitations that may cause error. Cognitive 
factors and bias affect all processes that involve 
interpretation, subjectivity, judgements and 
decisions.65 Awareness of and understanding about 
our inherent cognitive limitations and influences that 
increase the risk of error are essential components for 
minimizing error. However, awareness is not enough. 
A necessary step is to identify the particular risk 
factors for the discipline and implement measures to 
prevent or uncover any errors.66 Unfortunately, 
measures to address cognitive sources of error and 
bias are often only addressed when scandals 
appear.67 
Dr Itiel Dror has focused on cognitive and human error 
in decision-making within several areas, including 
forensic science, and has developed a taxonomy of 
sources that affect the decision-making of forensic 
experts. These are relevant to handling digital 
evidence in the context of a criminal investigation68 
and, hence, relevant for handling telecom data. These 
factors range from the inherent cognitive factors – 
which relate to how the brain processes information – 
to external contextual factors that influence the 
decision-making. Contextual factors may bias 
decisions, and they are found in the organizational 
culture and environment, as well as in the particular 
case. The explanations for why the errors in the 
                                                          
65 Dror, I. E. (2017). Human expert performance in forensic 
decision making: seven different sources of bias. Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences, 49(5), 541-547. 
66 Dror, I. E., & Pierce, M. L. (2019). ISO standards 
addressing issues of bias and impartiality in forensic work. 
Journal of Forensic Sciences. 
67 ISO standards addressing issues of bias and impartiality in 
forensic work , and Cole, S. A. (2016). Scandal, fraud, and 
the reform of forensic science: the case of fingerprint 
analysis. W. Va. L. Rev., 119, 523. 
68 Sunde, N., & Dror, I. E. (2019). Cognitive and human 
factors in digital forensics: Problems, challenges, and the 
way forward. Digital Investigation, 29, 101-108. 
Danish HCDRs were not uncovered earlier or why the 
warnings about error were ignored for such a long 
time may be found within the levels of this taxonomy, 
none of which seem to be irrelevant in this respect. 
Pohl explains cognitive bias as a cognitive 
phenomenon, which reliably deviates from reality, 
occurs systematically and involuntarily, and is difficult 
or impossible to avoid by mere willpower.69 One fact 
that may have played a role in the telecom scandal is 
confirmation bias, which can be described as a 
tendency to seek information that confirms one’s 
belief, and to overlook or explain away information 
that contradicts it.70 The receivers of HCDRs believed 
that the product they received from the Telecenter 
was of good quality.71 When the Telecenter (from 
December 2018) asked the receivers of the HCDRs to 
control the completeness of the converted data by 
comparing the number of rows, the receivers (who 
also believed that the Telecenter provided good 
quality) would get a confirmation of this notion of 
quality by comparing the lines in the two 
spreadsheets, although this would not reveal the true 
quality of the processed record. It should be noted 
that the police districts reported that they did not 
perform this control, since they trusted the Telecenter 
to deliver data that were accurate and complete.72 
The same bias may have affected the prosecution 
authorities. They received a report about the HCDR, 
often with extracts of the data included. Together 
with the report, they would also receive the 
converted HCDR. The prosecution authority checked 
whether the data included or referred to in the report 
were consistent with the data from the converted 
HCDR file.73 The prosecution authority did not have 
any knowledge of the insufficient quality control of 
the converted data file and would probably believe 
that the data were accurate and complete. If 
69 Pohl, R.F., 2016. Cognitive Illusions: Intriguing 
Phenomena in Judgement, Thinking and Memory. 
Psychology Press. 
70 Nickerson, R. S., 1998. Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous 
phenomenon in many guises. Review of general 
psychology, 2(2), 175-220. 
71 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
67. 
72 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
67. 
73 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
78. 
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consistency between the report and the converted 
data file were established, the prosecution authority 
would have this initial perception of high quality 
confirmed – even though this measure would not be 
sufficient to determine the true quality of the data. 
The accumulation of bias  
Earwaker and colleagues highlight that the failure to 
acknowledge and to respond to the interlinking 
nature of participants in criminal justice systems may 
lead to inappropriate use of evidence in intelligence 
(or investigative) settings or in court.74 When a piece 
of evidence passes through several participants, there 
is a risk of the accumulation of bias (called in the 
literature ‘bias snowball’ and ‘bias cascade’).75 The 
build-up of bias occurs when the effect of contextual 
information at one stage affects the decision at a later 
stage.76 For example, in the telecom scandal, the 
personnel at the Telecenter believed that the system 
performed well when processing the raw data. This 
overconfidence prevented quality control of the 
performance. When the data were received by the 
investigator, the investigator received them from 
someone they believed had specialist competence in 
assessing the data and trusted that the data were 
accurate and complete. When the prosecution 
received the data, they knew from the documentation 
that the data had been handled in several stages by 
people with a higher level of competence in telecom 
data than themselves. They would therefore also trust 
the data and, through the assessment of the 
consistency between data in the report and the 
converted data, this impression would intensify at 
each stage. The notion of quality could contribute to 
the decision about charging the suspect, and hence 
the bias would also pass into the court. 
                                                          
74 Earwaker, H., Nakhaeizadeh, S., Smit, N. M., & Morgan, R. 
M. (2019). A cultural change to enable improved decision-
making in forensic science: A six phased approach. Science 
& Justice, 12. 
75 Dror, I. E., 2018. Biases in forensic experts. Science, 360 
(6386), 243. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aat8443 and 
Dror, I. E., Morgan, R. M., Rando, C., & Nakhaeizadeh, S. 
(2017). Letter to the editor—The bias snowball and the bias 
cascade effects: Two distinct biases that may impact 
forensic decision making. Journal of Forensic Sciences, 
62(3), 832-833. 
76 Earwaker, H., Nakhaeizadeh, S., Smit, N. M., & Morgan, R. 
M. (2019). A cultural change to enable improved decision-
The cumulative effect of bias may affect the decisions 
made.77 For example, when the missing lines in the 
HCDR do not provide the suspect with an alibi (which 
he actually would have if the raw data were checked), 
this would lead to a strong belief in the suspect’s guilt. 
This could in turn lead to a more offensive suspect 
interview, confronting him with the missing alibi. The 
suspect’s behaviour may be due to the strong belief of 
guilt, underpinned by the HCDR, leading to tunnel 
vision, where the suspect interview, as well as other 
ambiguous evidence, would be interpreted to the 
detriment of the suspect. 
Implicit associations about technology and bias  
It is relevant to consider how technology affects 
human decisions. Elsbach and Stigliani suggest three 
general beliefs about new information technology: It 
is mysterious or unknown; it is non-human or alien, 
and it is complex or difficult to understand.78 Based 
on these general beliefs, they suggest that we make 
implicit associations, which are attitudes about 
objects “that are automatically activated by the mere 
presence of the object”.79 From their analysis of 
empirical findings, they suggest that people associate 
new technology with success and with superiority 
over older technology, and they relate this to the 
general belief in new information as mysterious or 
unknown. This may lead to the favouring of newer 
over older technology.80 
Elsbach and Stigliani also find empirical support for 
the assumption that technology endorsed by 
legitimate others may lead to a perception of the 
technology as trustworthy and valuable.81 They 
suggest that this is to do with the general belief in 
technology as complex and difficult to understand. 
In relation to the telecom scandal, the implicit bias 
may have played an important role: first, regarding 
making in forensic science: A six phased approach. Science 
& Justice, 60(1), 9-19. 
77 A cultural change to enable improved decision-making in 
forensic science: A six phased approach. 
78 Elsbach, K. D., & Stigliani, I. (2019). New information 
technology and implicit bias. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 33(2), 185-206. 
79 Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup 
bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53(1), 575-604. 
80 Elsbach, K. D., & Stigliani, I. (2019). New information 
technology and implicit bias. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 33(2), 185-206. 
81 New information technology and implicit bias, 185-206. 
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the introduction of a new system, even though it was 
not very stable and reliable.82 Here, we may assume 
that there was a perception of the new system as 
being superior to the old and less automated system 
or method for processing the HCDR. Second, when the 
members of staff at the Telecenter received the 
results the system produced, we suggest that they 
found the new system complex and difficult to 
understand (only one person was in charge of 
maintaining it) and trusted the responsible person or 
the technology to produce reliable and accurate 
results. And third, when the investigators received the 
raw file and the processed file from the Telecenter, 
we may assume that they would also perceive the 
system converting the data as complex or difficult to 
understand, and that the members of staff at the 
Telecenter were the legitimate others that made the 
result of the processing trustworthy. Each person in 
the chain represents a layer of trust and, hence, there 
is a reason for the bias to accumulate through the 
people involved in the criminal justice system. 
Procedures: inadequate quality management 
To ensure that the system deserves the trust, any 
technological system processing data that may be 
used as evidence in criminal proceedings should be 
subject to quality control.83 There are several 
possibilities for error in such a system that could 
delete, misinterpret or change data; the reliability and 
validity should, therefore, be controlled on a regular 
basis.84 This was identified as one of the contributing 
factors to the telecom scandal. The system used for 
converting the raw HCDR was trusted, without 
performing the necessary regular quality control. The 
personnel receiving the data at the Telecenter 
assumed that the system produced reliable and valid 
results when converting the data. However, the 
personnel at the Telecenter formed an additional 
layer of trust, since they were expected to be 
competent and to have performed quality control. 
This may explain why the personnel in the police 
                                                          
82 Holm, J., (3rd December 2013). Server-bommerter 
forsinkede vigtigt it-system i tre år. (Server flaws delayed 
important it-system for three years), available at  
https://www.computerworld.dk/art/229189/server-
bommerter-forsinkede-vigtigt-it-system-i-tre-aar. 
83 ENFSI, (2015). Best Practice Manual for the Forensic 
Examination of Digital Technology, ENFSI-BPM-FOT-01. 
Version 01 (November 2015). 
districts did not compare the converted data to the 
raw data. They trusted the quality of what they 
received from the Telecenter, even though the 
Telecenter asked them to control the number of lines 
in the two files. The prosecution authority was the 
only body that performed a quality check, according 
to the external examination.85 The problem was that 
they did not receive the raw data, but only the 
converted data file, upon which the quality check was 
done. Since the data in the report originated from the 
converted data file, no inconsistencies were detected. 
This may have led to a false assumption of quality and 
hence robustness of the HCDR as evidence in the 
criminal case. 
The system converting the HCDR, the people 
operating it, and the procedures they followed may 
be compared to what is framed as Digital Forensics as 
a Service (DFaaS). The concept originates from a 
project run by the Netherlands Forensics Institute.86 
DFaaS is described as a “service-based approach for 
processing and investigating the high volume of seized 
digital material”.87 Although the concept was 
described for digital forensics, it is highly relevant as 
inspiration for the handling of HCDR in the Danish 
police. Telecom data are also digital, and, although 
they come in different formats, they do not have the 
same level of complexity as other digital evidence may 
have. 
In DfaaS, digital information is stored in a central 
storage facility that purports to guarantee the 
integrity of the data. Detectives, digital forensic 
examiners and analysts may obtain access to and 
explore the data, run queries and visualize results. 
This service maintains and guarantees the integrity of 
the data, while enabling access in an effective way. 
Outside such a system, the integrity of digital files 
should be documented by calculating a cryptographic 
hash sum. This sum is unique, and, by comparing the 
hash sum of two files, one may conclude that they are 
84 For example, see Casey, E. (2002). Error, uncertainty and 
loss in digital evidence. International Journal of Digital 
Evidence, 1(2). 
85 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
78. 
86 Van Baar, R. B., Van Beek, H. M. A., & Van Eijk, E. J. 
(2014). Digital forensics as a service: A game changer. 
Digital Investigation, 11, 54-62. 
87 Digital forensics as a service: A game changer. 
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identical. Inside DfaaS, this was handled 
automatically. 
So, how was the integrity of the data handled in 
Denmark? The raw data were collected and stored, 
but only in a database and for a limited period of 24 
months.88 The personnel in the police districts could 
not obtain access to the original data stored in the 
database but received a file with the raw data, 
together with a file containing the converted data. To 
prove the integrity, a hash sum should have been 
computed from the original raw data file prior to 
sending it to the police district, or the original file 
should have been stored with the purpose of a later 
integrity check. The external review states that, in 
some police districts, HCDR were archived according 
to a fixed structure and with full version control.89 
However, the report does not say whether a hash sum 
was calculated for the original raw data prior to 
sending it out to the police districts, or whether the 
police district receiving the file had a routine of 
performing this procedure. If the original raw data file 
was deleted by the Telecenter, and no hash sum was 
calculated and stored, the integrity of the raw data 
file sent out to the police district could not be proven. 
According to the external review by Deloitte, the 
Telecenter did not store the raw data file, which 
means that there was no reliable source file to 
compare the converted data with. This means that 
when the Telecenter asked the receiver to compare 
the number of rows in the converted data against the 
raw data file they received, the Telecenter interrupted 
the continuity of the evidence and “outsourced” the 
responsibility for quality control to personnel that 
probably lacked the knowledge and tools to check and 
maintain the integrity of the data they had received. 
Technology or instrumental error  
Several of the errors uncovered in the telecom 
scandal have been articulated as technical errors, for 
instance that the processing led to missing rows and 
qualitative change of the data. However, the errors in 
the telecom scandal (including these) are mainly 
results of human errors. No machine programs itself, 
                                                          
88 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
17. 
89 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
17. 
90 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
47. 
and programming errors, such as the timing function 
that led to the omission of rows,90 points back to the 
human. It is widely recognized that a computer 
system should undergo regular reliability testing, 
particularly when changes are made, such as when it 
has undergone a version update.91 In relation to the 
telecom scandal, the validity of the outcome 
depended on how well the system handled the 
diverse raw data formats. The external review 
uncovered 100 different formats of raw data in the 
period from 2011-2019.92 This was complicated even 
further by unannounced format changes by the 
telecom service providers during this time period. The 
changes in format introduced a risk of erroneous 
interpretation of the raw data. Similar to 
programming errors, failing to update the system – or 
assessing whether it produces a valid outcome – is a 
human error. Minimizing interpretation error by 
updating and validating the system would require 
human effort. When the total manpower for handling 
this task, in addition to administering requests for 
HCDR from the police districts was 1.2 full-time 
positions, errors were probably unavoidable. 
Lessons learned from a human rights 
perspective  
Based on our knowledge of the telecom scandal, we 
argue for lessons learned in relation to: 
(i) transparency regarding data and 
procedures that might be presented as 
evidence in criminal trials; 
(ii) securing both data that is as correct and 
objective as possible from the outset and to 
the widest extent possible; and 
(iii) transparency in respect of the processing 
of data into another format, 
thus giving the suspect an insight into the evidence 
against him and the opportunity for an adversarial 
proceeding. As learned from the telecom scandal, 
even though no intent to cause errors and 
uncertainties was detected in the system or the 
91 For example https://www.nist.gov/itl/ssd/software-
quality-group/computer-forensics-tool-testing-program-
cftt. 
92 The external examination from Deloitte (Appendix 3), p. 
35. 
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personnel handling the telecom data, the risk of such 
implications can be built into or hidden in the systems 
and procedures. As well as witnesses in court being 
carefully interrogated in order to establish whether 
they are to be trusted or not, a constant critical 
review of the specific digital evidence must be 
maintained. 
Such a perspective would correspond with the right to 
a fair trial, according to article 6 in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As stated by the Grand 
Chamber in Rowe and Davis v The United Kingdom 
(Application no. 28901/95), 16th February 2000, § 60: 
“It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial 
that criminal proceedings, including the elements of 
such proceedings which relate to procedure, should 
be adversarial and that there should be equality of 
arms between the prosecution and defence. The right 
to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that 
both prosecution and defence must be given the 
opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on 
the observations filed and the evidence adduced by 
the other party.” 
The prosecution authorities are obliged to disclose all 
“material evidence” for or against the accused (see 
also Edwards v The United Kingdom (Application no. 
13071/87), 16th December 1992, § 36). This right 
relates to evidence that is relevant to the decision of 
the trial and the fairness of the trial as a whole, 
contrary to material of minor relevance. Furthermore, 
the Court of Human Rights accepts certain restrictions 
to this right to material evidence, if strictly necessary 
to protect specific public interests (Van Mechelen and 
others v Netherlands (Application no. 21363/93 and 
others), 23rd April 1997, § 58) and provided these 
limitations to the defence are sufficiently 
counterbalanced by the procedures applied by the 
national courts (Rowe and Davis v The United 
Kingdom, § 62). 
Digital evidence might “cheat the eye”, as the 
accurate and numerical representations of data 
appear objective and indisputable, but specifications 
and details of procedures must be presented for the 
defence to challenge and perhaps subject to closer 
scrutiny. The view of the Court of Human Rights on 
expert witnesses and their statements has been that 
even though “the domestic judge has a wide 
discretion in choosing amongst conflicting expert 
opinions and picking one which he or she deems 
consistent and credible” in the context of expert 
evidence, “the rules on its admissibility must not 
deprive the defence of the opportunity to challenge it 
effectively, in particular by introducing or obtaining 
alternative opinions and reports” (Matytsina v Russia 
(Application no. 58428/10), 27th June 2014, § 169). As 
stated in Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v Russia 
(Application no. 11082/06 and other), 25th July 2013, 
§ 711: “There is an extensive case-law of the Court 
which guarantees to the defence a right to study and 
challenge not only an expert report as such but also 
the credibility of those who have prepared it, through 
their direct questioning” (reference made to 
Brandstetter v Austria (Application no. 11170/84 and 
others), 28th August 1991, § 42, Doorson v the 
Netherlands (Application no. 20524/92), 26th March 
1996, §§ 81-82, and Mirilashvili v Russia (Application 
no. 6293/04), 11th December 2008, § 158). 
Accordingly, the precondition for a challenge of digital 
evidence by the defence is the requirement of the 
prosecution to present the data not simply as columns 
and figures extracted from a data system. To support 
the ability of the defence to challenge the evidence, 
the prosecution must provide a transparent 
presentation of the data and the processes as a 
whole, with all the inherent risk of errors and 
uncertainties. Specifically, there must be transparency 
concerning the uncertainties that relate to technical 
and human factors when handling and processing the 
data. Information about which a specific expert is 
responsible for the processing must be clear and 
available, in order to secure the defence the insight 
and the possibility of cross-examination. 
Telecom data or other kinds of data might not always 
be “material evidence” according to the practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights, but when the 
prosecution refers to such data in court as either 
grounds for investigative measures or evidence in a 
trial, the details of the data must be presented, in 
order to secure equality of arms and an adversarial 
hearing, as part of the right to a fair trial in article 6. 
The measures presented by the Minister of Justice 
indicate a new regime for handling and processing 
HCDR in criminal investigations. However, without 
transparency, there is a risk that the measures will not 
necessarily increase the quality of HCDR evidence but 
represent several new layers of trust hiding the true 
quality of the evidence. 
Considering the Danish telecom scandal and the 
thorough scrutiny of the whole chain of gathering, 
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processing and using HCDR as evidence in criminal 
trials, there is reason to believe that this subject has 
been settled for the time being. However, in January 
2020, the Danish newspapers broke the news that, in 
relation to 1,000 customers, a Danish telecom service 
provider had been delivering the content of SMS 
communication to the Danish police, who had only 
presented a court order for signalling data.93 In 
February 2020, it was revealed by the press that, since 
September 2018, in a number of cases, the same 
service provider had been delivering data related to 
the recipient telephone numbers from specific 
communications, in addition to signalling data, even 
though the police were only presenting court orders 
for signalling data.94 The service provider stated to the 
press that, due to the their IT system, the signalling 
data were not separated from data related to 
communication, and the problem had been 
recognized and discussed with the Danish National 
Police since March 2019; however, despite insufficient 
court orders, no halt has been called to the continuing 
delivering of communication data.95 
From both a forensic and a legal perspective, a 
continuing focus on the use of historical cell data 
records as evidence in criminal cases is constantly 
relevant and necessary, and the same focus and 
scrutiny seems highly justified in regard to other types 
of technical evidence. 




                                                          
93 Kaare Kronberg Jensen and Jacob Haislund: “Private sms-
beskeder delt ved en fejl”, in Jyllands-Posten on 26th 
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